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Abstract: In designing public policy it is not enough to consider the
possible reaction of individuals to the chosen policy. Public policy may
also affect the formation of preferences and norms in a society. The
endogenous evolution of preferences, in addition to introducing a conceptual
difficulty in evaluating policies, may also eventually affect actual behavior.
In order to demonstrate the implications of endogenous preferences on the
design of optimal public policy, we present a model in which a subsidy
policy is set to encourage contributions towards a public good. However
this policy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower
level of contribution towards the public good despite the explicit monetary
incentives to raise that level.
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“Social scientists – especially economists – evaluate policies and institutions by
examining behavioral responses to incentives, with values, habits, and social norms taken
as given and beyond analysis and the reach of public policy”    Aaron (1994)
1.  Introduction
The axiom of exogenous preferences is one of the cornerstones of economic
modeling. Models typically begin with the specification of players’ preferences and
then proceed to analyze market interactions. The exogenous preferences assumption
reflects the general approach of “taking individuals as they are,” although it has, at the
same time, considerably simplified the task of economic theory.
1 Models that examine
public policy are no different. The focus of these models is on the effect of public
policy on the outcomes of the market interaction assuming that preferences are
exogenously given. The possible effect of public policy on the formation of preferences,
values and norms of behavior is largely ignored.
2
In recent years, we have seen a growing literature that studies the endogenous
formation of preferences. The basic approach in this literature is that preferences
evolve over time, depending on the players’ actions and the outcomes of market
interactions. The preference dynamics may be the outcome of imitation, education, or
other forms of cultural transmission dynamics. Preference dynamics have been studied
so far mainly using an evolutionary approach.
3 In this approach, a fitness criterion
                                                            
1  It is interesting to quote Becker’s view on this issue: “… all human behavior can be viewed as
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences...” (1976).
2   For more on this problematic approach see Bowles (1998), who wrote: “Markets and other
economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they also influence the evolution
of values, taste, and personalities.”
3  The evolutionary approach does not necessarily advocate a biologically based preference
dynamics although recent studies have shown the existence of genes that determine preference
attributes like risk aversion. While the setup is based on evolutionary dynamics, the mechanism
that governs these dynamics may be rooted in behavior such as imitation and education. For
evolutionary models that endogenize preferences see Basu (1995), Bester and Güth (1998), Dekel
and Scotchmer (1999), Fershtman and Weiss (1997,1998), Huck and Oechssler (1999),
Koçkesen et al. (2000), Robson (1996), and Rogers (1994).3
replaces preferences as the exogenously given primitive of the model. Within a
population, the frequency of individuals with certain preferences increases if their
fitness is above the average fitness in the population.
4 Another possible approach to
modeling preference dynamics is cultural transmission (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) and Bisin and Verdier (1998)), in which the effects of imitation and
education on preference dynamics are explicitly modeled. In both approaches,
however, the preference dynamics imply that the preference profile at period  t+1
depends on the preference profile at period t, on the outcome of market interactions at
period t, and possibly on the individuals’ efforts to transmit their preferences to the next
generation.
Preference dynamics introduces a direct link between public policy and the
formation of preferences. Public policy changes the outcomes of market interactions and
thus affects the evolution of future preferences profiles.
5 Thus, in designing an optimal
public policy, it is not enough to consider the possible reaction of individuals to that
policy; we should take into account as well the effects of different policies on the
formation of preferences and subsequently on behavior.
The relationship between public policy and preferences introduces conceptual
difficulties in studying (or even defining) optimal public policies. The standard
economic modeling approach is to define the optimal policy with respect to an
optimality criterion (such as maximum total welfare) which ranks market outcomes
given an exogenously specified profile of preferences. An optimal policy is, therefore,
                                                            
4  Clearly, the discussion regarding the appropriate assumptions about preferences is replaced in this
model by the discussion about the appropriate fitness criterion. This is an important discussion
which is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Social factors may enter into the fitness
criterion but, for simplicity’s sake, we will adopt in our example the assumption that the fitness
criterion is a monetary payoff.
5 In some cases the effect may be only transitory. But one cannot exclude (as we will demonstrate
in our model) that steady state preferences also depend on public policy.4
one that induces a market outcome that is not dominated (in terms of the optimality
criterion) by a market outcome induced by another public policy. However, when
public policy affects the evolution of preferences, the above selection procedure is no
longer valid. The optimality condition may rank outcomes only for given preferences.
Moreover, ranking profiles of preferences or comparing outcomes for different
preferences is known to be a problematic or even an impossible task. Even if these
conceptual problems can be avoided, endogenous preference formation may induce
time consistency problems.
6 The policy that was optimal for one preference profile may
induce a new preference profile for which the policy is no longer optimal.
In order to demonstrate the implications of endogenous preferences on the
design of public policy, we consider a simple example in which contributions towards
a public good are encouraged by direct monetary subsidization. We adopt the
endogenous preference setting of Fershtman and Weiss (1997), into which we introduce
a public good term and study the effects of subsidization on the preference dynamics.
7
Individuals in this model are pair-wise matched and play a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like
game. The players’ actions affect their direct payoffs in the game and the aggregate
action contributes toward a public good they all commonly enjoy. Furthermore, the
players may also care about their social status, which is determined by their relative
contribution to the public good. However, this concern for social status is not
necessarily shared by all players. We do not impose any preference profile; rather, we
assume an evolutionary selection process that determines the profile endogenously. We
then assume that a subsidy policy is used in order to promote the accumulation of the
                                                                                                                                                                              
6     see also Peleg and Yaari (1973).
7  The main concern of Fershtman  and Weiss (1997) was indeed to show that even when the
evolutionary process is governed by a fitness function that takes only monetary payoffs into5
public good. A short run analysis (assuming given preferences) indicates that such a
subsidy indeed increases the equilibrium level of the public good. In the long run,
however, the subsidy policy induces a shift in the distribution of preferences, reducing
the number of socially minded individuals. Such a shift reduces the social incentives as
well as the proportion of the population that cares about them. Consequently, the
subsidy policy results in a lower level of the public good as the greater monetary
incentives do not offset the disappearance of the social incentives.
The importance of social rewards in providing incentives or compensation for
individuals who perform activities with positive externalities was already suggested by
Arrow (1971). Is society free to use any level of “honor” and “status” as compensation
for social services? This issue was addressed in Fershtman and Weiss (1998), who
showed that (i) some social activities cannot be induce by social rewards and (ii) when
social rewards are overused, they cease to be effective because preferences may
endogenously change, thereby reducing the emphasis individuals place on those social
rewards. In this paper, however, we emphasize the possible limits of standard monetary
incentives in inducing activities with social benefits. The mechanism that explains this
phenomenon is one where the use of monetary incentives triggers an endogenous
preferences shift. This shift implies not simply lower social incentives, but also a
smaller proportion of individuals who care about those particular social rewards.
The above result resembles a well-known argument in social psychology. In a
controversial paper, Titmuss (1970) argued that allowing payments for blood donations
will result in a lower level (and even in a lower quality) of donation.
8 This hypothesis
suggests that in some circumstances, monetary rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation
                                                                                                                                                                              
account, the evolutionary stable preference profile may be such that some or all individuals have
social preferences.6
like civic duty. The problem of the “crowding out effect” has been studied since then by
cognitive social psychologists
9 as well as by economists.
10 While our model predicts
similar outcomes, the underlying phenomenon is quite different. The emphasis in the
psychological and experimental economics literature is on the effect of monetary
incentives on the perception of people regarding the social rewards themselves. That is,
if a price is placed on a blood donation, then donating blood is not necessarily such a
noble act nor a civic duty. Our model, on the other hand, focuses on the possibility that
monetary incentives may induce a change in the underlying preference profile.
11 The
outcome of such a preference shift may indeed change the relative importance of
intrinsic motivation and of extrinsic monetary rewards.
2.  Sketch of the Argument
Consider a population of size  N in which individuals may have different
preferences. Let  { } n p p P , , 1 K ”  be the set of possible preferences (or types). The
distribution of types is given by  ( ) Q q q q n ˛ ” , , 1 K , such that  i q  is the percentage of
individuals in the population with preferences  i p . Preferences are defined over a set of
possible outcomes,  F. We define an outcome broadly so that it may consist of an
                                                                                                                                                                              
8  See also Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) for a critical review of this argument. Both these papers
argued that monetary incentives should be simply added to the intrinsic incentives.
9    See Deci (1971), Deci (1975) and for a survey of this literature see Lane (1991).
10   See for example Frey (1994), Frey et al. (1996) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) for a
detailed examination of the crowding-out effect, and Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiget (1996), Fehr
and Gachter (1998), and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b) for a recent experimental study on the
effectiveness of monetary incentives.
11  The change in preferences may indirectly influence the value placed on the social rewards. For
example, if fewer people care about status, the value of status might decline.7
allocation of goods as well as of non-monetary elements that induce some social
ranking (for example, social status).
Given their preferences, individuals are engaged in a market game in which they
need to choose an action  X x˛ . The government may intervene in this market game by
formulating a policy that induces a system of incentives or rewards. Let
{ } M g g G , , 1 K ”  be the set of possible government policies. The players’ actions
( ) N x x , , 1 K , together with the government policy  j g , determine the outcome of the
market game.
The optimal action of each individual depends on his preferences  i p , on the
distribution of preferences in the population q, on the actions taken by other individuals
and on the government’s public policy  j g .
12  For any given public policy  j g  and
distribution of preference types q, we assume that there is a unique equilibrium of the
market game and that the equilibrium action chosen by an individual of type i is given
by  ) g , q , p ( x x j i i = . The equilibrium outcome of the market game is denoted as
F ˛ ) g , q ( j f .
13
The basic approach of the theory of optimal public policy included the
following steps: (i) it adopts an optimality criterion F
 14 that, for every given preference
profile q, induces a (possibly partial) ranking,  q F , over the set of outcomes,  F; and
(ii) given the distribution of preferences q, it selects an optimal policy,  G g
* ˛ , such
                                                            
12  Note that this optimal action may depend on the preferences of other individuals and not just on
their actions. For example, in order to allow for preferences with a social element like status
individuals may care about their status only if other individuals in their community view status as
an important factor (see the discussion in Fershtman and Weiss (1997) and in section 3).
13  Clearly, existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium is not guaranteed but, in order to
sketch our argument, we will avoid these issues and assume both existence and uniqueness.
14  The optimality criterion can be, for example, maximum welfare, overall monetary payoffs, Pareto
optimality, and so on.8
that there is no other public policy  G g ˛  for which  ) , ( g q f  dominates  ) , (
* g q f  in
terms of the ranking  q F ,  that is,  ( ) ( ) ) , ( ) , (
* g q F g q F q q f f ‡  for all  G g˛ .
The stated public policy selection procedure is the standard framework used in
the public policy literature. This procedure is well defined under the assumption that
preferences are exogenously given, i.e., q is given and not affected by the policy choice
g.
The basic structure of the endogenous preferences approach entails that the
preference distribution at period t+1 depends on the preference distribution at period t
and on the outcome of the market game at period t, i.e.  ) , q ( D q t t f = +1 . The function
) , ( ￿ ￿ D  is the population dynamics that may be induced by a process of imitation,
learning, evolution or cultural transmission. Since the outcome of the market game is
affected by the existing public policy, the link between policy and the evolution of
preferences is established; hence,  ( ) ) , ( , 1 g q q D q t t t f = + .
For every initial distribution of preferences  0 q , and public policy  g, we can
define  ( ) g q q
f , 0  as the limit of the above preference dynamics process.
15  The steady
state condition is:
( ) ( ) ) , ( ), , ( ) , (     ) 1 ( 0 0 0 g q q g q q D g q q
f f f f =
A preference profile q is stable under the public policy g if there is a small
neighborhood of q such that for every q’ in this neighborhood,  ( ) q g q q
f = , ' .
When public policy affects preferences, the task of identifying an optimal policy
becomes quite problematic. First, there is the familiar conceptual problem of evaluating
the implication of a preference change. There are no absolute criteria that can determine
                                                            
15  Clearly, this limit does not necessarily exist, but we ignore this issue for now and assume a
convergence of the population dynamics process.9
if individuals are better off with one set of preferences or another. We can think about
an individual with two different sets of preferences as two different individuals but
interpersonal comparison of utility is known to be dubious.
When preferences are exogenous, public policy affects only the market
equilibrium outcomes. The social ranking  q F , which is derived from the exogenous
preference profile and the optimality criterion F, is not a function of  g. When public
policy changes the population’s preference profile from  t q  to  1 + t q , this effect carries
over immediately to the ranking, and 
t q F  becomes 
1 + t q F . This raises the question of
whether the outcome of the market interaction should be evaluated by the “old” or the
16
One may also consider the following time consistency problem. Let  0 q be the
initial preference profile. Given 
0 q F , the optimal policy 
* g  is determined such that
( ) ( ) ) , ( ) , ( 0
*
0 0 0 g q F g q F q q f f ‡  for all  G g˛ . But when preferences evolve
endogenously, the outcome induced by the policy 
* g  changes the underlying
preferences profile to  ( ) ) , ( ,
*
0 0 1 g q q D q f = . This new preference profile results in a
new ranking, 
1 q F , for which 
* g  is not necessarily optimal, i.e. there is a policy
* , g g G g „ ˛  such that  ( ) ( ) ) , ( ) , (
*
1 1 1 1 g q F g q F q q f f > . A similar consistency problem
may arise when we restrict the evaluation of the effect of the public policy to the limit
preferences induced by 
* g , i.e.,  ( )
*
0,g q q
f . The policy 
* g , which is optimal for the
initial preference profile  0 q , is not necessarily optimal for the ranking  f q F , which




3.  Subsidizing a Public Good
We follow Fershtman and Weiss (1997), hereinafter FW, and consider a setting
in which preferences are endogenously determined by an evolutionary process. We
introduce into that model a public good term and investigate the effects of subsidization
on individual behavior, the formation of preferences, and the overall equilibrium level
of the public good.
3.1  The Market Interaction
Consider a society with a large number  N of individuals. In every period,
individuals are pairwise matched and play a Prisoners’ Dilemma-type game. Each
player in this game needs to choose an effort level  i e  from the set {0,1}. Let  ) , ( j i i e e P
be the direct monetary payoffs of player i, who is matched with player j. The values of
(.,.) i P  are given in the following payoff matrix:
where  d a g b > > > . We further assume that   g b d a - > - .
In addition to the direct payoff, the players’ overall efforts contribute toward a
public good which they all commonly enjoy. Let  e ˆ be the total amount of effort in the
                                                                                                                                                                              
16  One way to avoid this problem and to use the standard optimality criterion is to adopt a multiple







g   ,   g d   ,   b
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Fig. 1: The Payoff Matrix11
population and let E(.) be a public good term such that E(.),E’(.) > 0. Player i’s overall
payoffs are: 
17
) ˆ ( ) , ( ) ˆ , , (     ) 2 ( e E e e e e e m j i i j i i + P ” .
We assume that N is sufficiently large such that the effect of ei on  e ˆ is negligible
and each player views  e ˆ as fixed. Like FW, we assume that the chosen effort level
determines, besides the above monetary payoffs, also the individuals’ social status.
Players, however, do not necessarily care about status. Some may simply maximize
their economic payoffs (2), while others may value a high social status as well. We do
not impose any preference profile but derive it endogenously. For simplicity, we allow
for only two types of preferences, players that care about their social status and players
who totally disregard it. Denoting the social reward by  S, the utility of player i is:
i i i i p m U S + =     ) 3 (
where  { } 1 , 0 ˛ i p  is the preference parameter. Individuals with pi=1, hereinafter type 1
individuals, care about their social status, whereas individuals with  pi=0, hereinafter
type 0 individuals, do not care about social status. Let  [ ] 1 0, q˛  denote the proportion of
type 1 players in the population.
When effort is positively correlated with status, social rewards encourage
individuals to contribute toward the public good (see Arrow (1971) for a discussion on
the role of social rewards). Letting the average effort 
a e ,  N e e
a ˆ = , represent the
social norm, we assume that status (positive or negative) is conferred upon an
individual according to her performance relative to the social norm. We further assume
                                                                                                                                                                              
selves approach. In such a case, it is possible to evaluate the future market outcomes from the
point of view of today’s preferences. See for example Peleg and Yaari (1973).
17  To simplify calculations we assume that the public good term enters additively.12
that only socially minded individuals can confer status on others. Consequently, the
social reward to individual i is given by
) (     ) 4 (
a
i i e e q - ” S s
where s  is an exogenously given marginal social reward parameter.
Substituting (2) and (4) into (3), we obtain the following expression for the
utility of player i -
) ˆ ( ) ( ) , ( ) , , , (     ) 5 ( e E e e q p e e q e e e U
a
i i j i i
a
j i i + - + P = s
 We assume that the players’ types are fully observable.
18 We can now derive
the equilibrium actions in the above game. Since there is a large number of players,
individual players do not affect the public good term  ) ˆ (e E  which, can therefore be
ignored in considering the game between each pair of players.
19
When the two players are of type 0, the game is represented by the payoff matrix
in Figure 1. This is a standard Prisoner Dilemma game; at equilibrium, both players
exert no effort and end up with  ) , ( a a  payoffs.
When a type 1 player is matched with a type 0 player, the game can be
represented by the following payoff matrix: 
20
                                                            
18  This assumption can be replaced by a setup in which we let each pair play a repeated game and
assume some learning mechanism that allows their actions to converge to Nash equilibrium
actions.
19   Therefore, when there is no subsidy, the analysis of the equilibrium actions is similar to the one
described in FW.
20  For type 1 player, we need to subtract 
a e qs  from each term in the matrix. This does not, however,
change the equilibrium strategy.
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Fig. 2: Type 1 v. Type 013
In equilibrium, the type 0 player exerts no effort, whereas the effort exerted by
the type 1 player depends on the magnitude of the  s q  term. When  d a s - > q , type 1
player exerts an effort and the equilibrium payoffs are  ) , ( b s d q + . Otherwise, type 1
exerts no effort, which yields the equilibrium payoffs  ) , ( a a .
A game between two type 1 players can be represented by the following payoff
matrix: 
21
The solution of this game also depends upon the magnitude of the  s q  term:
-  If   g b s - < q , both players exert no effort at equilibrium.
-  If   d a s - > q , both players exert an effort at equilibrium.
-  If  d a s d b - < < - q , the game has two pure strategy equilbria, one
equilibrium where both players exert no effort, and another equilibrium
where both players exert an effort. We assume that with some (strictly)
                                                            
21  Recall that the public good and the 
a e qs  terms have been omitted.
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Fig. 3: Type 1 v. Type 114




So far, we have assumed that part of the population indeed cares about status.
Intuitively, this is not surprising for most people would agree that status is an important
consideration. However, justifying preferences that differ from the standard homo
economicus paradigm is not trivial. The main concern of the endogenous preferences
literature has been indeed to show that such preferences may still be the outcome of
some preference dynamics and may survive the evolutionary process.
23
Let  ) , ' , ( M q p p  denote the equilibrium monetary payoffs of a type  p  player
when matched with a type  ' p  player given q, the proportion of type 1 players in the
population. Note that since the equilibrium level of effort for each type of interaction is
already specified, both 
a e and e ˆ are uniquely determined by q. Let  ) (
1 q W  and  ) (
0 q W
be the expected equilibrium payoffs of types 1 and 0, respectively:
) , 0 , 0 ( ) 1 ( ) , 1 , 0 ( ) (
) , 0 , 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , 1 , 1 ( ) (
0
1
q M q q qM q W
q M q q qM q W
- + ”
- + ”
We assume general preference dynamics, which are monotonic in the monetary
payoffs. Obviously, one can conceive of population dynamics in which fitness is
different from monetary payoffs. Such an assumption would probably be more realistic.
However, there is no such clear and unequivocal candidate for the fitness function. We
therefore choose to be conservative and to assume that fitness is simply the monetary
                                                            
22  For convenience we ignore the mixed strategy equilibrium.
23  For example, this literature has shown the possible evolutionary stability of preferences for social
status - Fershtman and Weiss (1997, 1998), fairness – Güth and Yaari (1992) and Huck and
Oechssler (1999), and altruism – Bester and Güth (1998).15
payoffs. Following the definition of evolutionary stability developed by Maynard Smith
(1982) (see also Weibull (1995)), three types of dynamically stable populations (or
preference profiles) are possible in the present model:
(a)  A homogenous type 1 population is dynamically stable iff
  ) 1 (   ) 1 (   :  that  such    0    and    ) 1 (   ) 1 (  
0 1 0 1 e e m e m - > - < " > $ ‡ W W W W  ; 
24
(b)  A homogenous type 0 population is dynamically stable iff
  ) (   ) (   :  that  such    0    and    ) 0 (   ) 0 (  
1 0 1 0 e e m e m W W W W > < " > $ ‡  ; 
25
(c)  A mixed  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ q  population is dynamically stable iff
) (   ) (    and    ) (   ) (                                            
:  that  such    0    and    ) (   ) (  
0 1 0 1
0 1
e e e e
m e m
- > - + < +
< " > $ =
q W q W q W q W
q W q W
.
We now characterize the stable preference profile and equilibrium actions
given the status parameter s . Note that since type 0 players never exert an effort, the
total effort e ˆ, is determined by the number of type 1 players who do exert an effort.
Observation 1:
(i) When  g b s - < , at equilibrium, both type 1 and type 0 players exert no effort in any
interaction. Hence, the two types are undistinguishable in their behavior. There is no
stable preference profile, and the total effort is  0 ˆ = e .
(ii) When  d a s g b - < < - , the only stable preference profile is q = 1. All players
exert an effort; and thus,  N e = ˆ .
(iii) When  d a s - > , the unique evolutionary stable preference profile is
s d a s / ) ( ) ( - = q . Type 0 players exert no effort. Type 1 players exert an effort when
                                                            
 
24  An equivalent condition is:  [ ] 1 , 1  that   such    0 m m - ˛ " > $ q   ) , 1 , 0 ( ) , 1 , 1 ( q M q M ‡  and
) , 0 , 0 ( ) , 0 , 1 ( q M q M >  if  ) , 1 , 0 ( ) , 1 , 1 ( q M q M = .16
matched with other type 1 players but they exert effort only with probability  ) (s l
when matched with type 0 players.  ) (s l  is given by:
d s a s b s
a g s
s l
)) ( 1 ( )) ( 2 1 ( ) (
) )( (
) (     ) 6 (
q q q
q
- - - +
-
= .
Hence, total effort in the population is:
[ ]N q q q e ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ     ) 7 ( s l s s s s - + = .
Proof:  (i) Immediate from the equilibrium behavior.  (ii) First, note that type 0 players
always choose  0 = e . Hence, we focus on the equilibrium strategies of type 1 players.
Given that  d a s g b - < < - , consider the following two possible ranges of q:
(1)  s g b ) ( - £ q : Type 1 players always exert no effort, and are thus
indistinguishable from type 0 players. Therefore, no preference profile in this
range is evolutionary stable.
(2)  s g b ) ( - > q  (note that  s d a ) ( 1 - < £ q ): type 1 players, when matched with
each other, sometimes exert an effort but never exert an effort when matched with
type 0 players. Hence, the monetary payoff of type 1 players exceeds that of type 0
players, and q rises until it reaches the only stable preference profile,  q = 1. In a
stable homogenous type 1 population, every player exerts an effort.
(iii) Given that  d a s - > , consider the following three possible ranges of q:
(1)  s g b ) ( - £ q : As shown in the proof of part (ii), no preference profile in this
range is evolutionary stable.
(2)   s d a s g b ) ( ) ( - < < - q :  As shown in the proof of part (ii), the monetary
payoff of type 1 players in this range exceeds that of type 0 players, and q rises.
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
25  An equivalent condition is:  [ ] m m , 0  that   such    0 ˛ " > $ q   ) , 0 , 1 ( ) , 0 , 0 ( q M q M ‡  and17
However, contrary to the part (ii) scenario, here  1 ) ( < - s d a , implying that  q
will continue to rise until it reaches  s d a ) ( - = q  and exits range (2). Hence, no
preference profile in this range is evolutionary stable.
(3)   s d a ) ( - > q : Type 1 players always exert effort. Therefore, the monetary payoff
for type 0 players exceeds that for type 1 players, and q decreases until it reaches
s d a ) ( - = q  and exits range (3). Hence, no preference profile in this range is
evolutionary stable. After ruling out all other possibilities, and based upon the
analysis of range (2) and range (3), we are left with  s d a s ) ( ) ( - = q  as the
unique stable preference profile.
Given the stable preference profile  s d a s ) ( ) ( - = q , the equilibrium actions
are: When two type 1 players meet, they both exert an effort. When two type 0 players
meet, they both exert no effort. When a type 1 player meets a type 0 player, the type 0
player exerts no effort and the type 1 player is indifferent between exerting an effort and
refraining from doing so. Hence, two outcomes are plausible: outcome (a), in which
both players exert no effort, and outcome (b), in which the type 1 player exerts an effort
and the type 0 player exerts no effort. Adding evolutionary stability to the equilibrium
conditions, we can derive the percentage of interactions in which each one of the two
outcomes occurs. Let l denote the percentage of interactions in which the type 1 player
exerts effort (i.e., outcome (b)). Evolutionary stability implies    q W   q W ) ( ) (
0 1 = or :
[ ] [ ] a a l lb a l ld g ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( q q q q - + - + = - + - +
Solving for l, we obtain:
d s a s b s
a g s
s l





- - - +
-
= .
                                                                                                                                                                              
) , 1 , 1 ( ) , 1 , 0 ( q M q M >  if  ) , 0 , 1 ( ) , 0 , 0 ( q M q M = .18
Note that  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ l  for all values of s  in the relevant range (i.e., for all  d a s - > ).
26
Therefore, both outcomes occur with positive probabilities.
Total effort in the population, that is, the number of times that type 1 players exert an
effort, is given by   [ ]N q q q e ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ s l s s s s - + = .          ￿
3.2  The Effect of Subsidy on Effort
Assume now that given the positive externalities generated by the players’
efforts, the government considers using a subsidy policy designed to encourage
individuals to exert more effort. Given a direct subsidy s for exerting an effort, player
i‘s utility function becomes:
) ˆ ( ) ( ) , (                                    
) , , , (     ) 8 (
e E se e e q p e e
se p m q e e e U
i
a
i i j i i
i i i i
a
j i i
+ + - + P =
= + S + =
s
The subsidy can clearly be large enough to induce all players to exert effort. But
such a policy is not necessarily optimal given the cost of raising funds. When
g b s - < , the equilibrium behavior is that all players exert no effort; thus,  0 ˆ = e . In
such a case, a sufficiently large subsidy could induce players to exert effort. Yet, such a
case is less interesting for our current discussion because regardless of the subsidy
level, the two player types remain undistinguishable; thus, no stable preference profile
is possible. When  d a s g b - < < - , the only stable preference profile is q = 1. In this
case, all players exert an effort and  N e = ˆ ; therefore, there is no room for a subsidy
policy. However, when  d a s - > , the evolutionary stable preference profile is
s d a s ) ( ) ( - = q  and total effort is  [ ]N q q q e ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ s l s s s s - + = .
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Therefore, we choose to focus on the region of  d a s - >  as in this region, total effort
depends directly on the equilibrium distribution of preferences.
We divide our discussion into two parts. The first is the traditional short run
analysis of the effects of a subsidy policy. In this part of the analysis, preferences are
given at the equilibrium level  ) (s q , and we show that subsidization does indeed
increase total effort (and thus the level of the public good). We then proceed to the long
run analysis in which the distribution of preferences may be affected by the subsidy
policy. For simplicity, we assume that the policy maker is contemplating two possible
policies, a no-subsidy policy and an s ˆ-level subsidy policy.
3.2.1  The Effect of a Subsidy Policy in the Short Run
We first examine the effects of an  s ˆ-level subsidy policy under the assumption
of exogenous preferences. We consider the case in which the subsidy level is
insufficiently large, that is,  g b - < s ˆ , such that type 0 players are not induced to exert
effort. Hence, the  s ˆ-level subsidy policy can increase overall effort only by inducing
more type 1 players to exert effort.
Observation 2: When  d a s - >  and given the preference profile  ) (s q , the use of an
s ˆ-level subsidy policy yields higher total effort in the short run.
Proof:  Since  g b - < s ˆ , the subsidy has no effect on the behavior of type 0 players and
on the interaction between two type 1 players (in which both players exert an effort).
When type 1 and type 0 are matched, recall that without subsidization, at equilibrium,
type 1 players are indifferent between exerting and not exerting any effort. Adding a20
subsidy s ˆ breaks this indifference.
27 Hence, type 1 will always exert an effort, and the
overall effort in the economy will become  N q ) (s . Also recall that without a subsidy
policy, total effort is  [ ]N q q q ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( s l s s s - + . Therefore, since  1 ) ( < s l , it is
clear that in the short run the subsidy policy raises the overall effort level.     ￿
3.2.2 The Impact of the Subsidy Policy when Preferences are Endogenous
The subsidy policy affects the relative monetary payoffs of the two types of
players. According to the general payoff monotonic dynamics defined above, a
preference profile can change, implying that a subsidy policy can affect the final
distribution of preferences. The following observation demonstrates that when the
preference dynamics are taken into account, a subsidy policy may decrease the share of
type 1 players in the population and lower total effort and the level of the public good.
Observation 3: When  d a s - > , a subsidy  g b - < s ˆ  will have the following effects
in the long run:
(i)   The share of type 1 players in the population will decrease ; and
(ii)  Total effort in the population will decrease.
Proof: (i) Recall that at the zero subsidy stable equilibrium, only  1 ) ( < s l  percent of
those type 1 players who are matched with type 0 players exert effort (see Observation
1(iii)). Since at such an equilibrium players of type 1 who are matched with type 0
players are indifferent between exerting and not exerting an effort, the subsidy policy
induces them to exert an effort whenever they are matched with type 0 players.
                                                            
27  Note that any positive subsidy, no matter how small, guarantees that type 1 players always exert
effort. This discontinuity in the short run effects of a subsidy policy stems from our intentionally21
Consequently, type 1’s monetary payoffs decrease (since  s ˆ + >d a ) and type 0’s
monetary payoffs increase (since  a b > ). As a result,    q W   q W ) ( ) (
0 1 < , and
evolutionary dynamics drive q down until a new stable profile emerges. Following the
logic of Observation 1(iii), the percentage of type 1 players in the new stable
preference profile is:  ( ) s d a s s s q ˆ ) ˆ , ( - - = . Clearly:
( ) ( ) ) 0 , ( ˆ ) ˆ , ( s s d a s d a s q s s q = - < - - = .
This concludes part (i) of the proof.
(ii) At the new stable equilibrium, induced by the subsidy policy, players of type 1
exert an effort only in  ) ˆ , ( s s l  percent of their interactions with type 0 players, where:
) ˆ ))( ˆ , ( 1 ( )) ˆ , ( 2 1 ( ) ˆ , (
) ˆ )( ˆ , (
) ˆ , (
s s q s q s q
s s q
s
+ - - - +
- +
=
d s a s b s
a g s
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We need to show that the total effort induced by the subsidy policy,
( )N s s q s q s q s e ) ˆ , ( )) ˆ , ( 1 ( ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ , ( ˆ s l s s s s - + = , is smaller than the total effort with a
no-subsidy policy,  ( )N q q q e ) 0 , ( )) 0 , ( 1 ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ( ˆ s l s s s s - + = . By part (i),
) 0 , ( ) ˆ , ( s s q s q < . Hence, it is sufficient to show that:
[ ] 0 ) 0 , ( )) 0 , ( 1 ( ) 0 , ( ) ˆ , ( )) ˆ , ( 1 ( ) ˆ , (     ) 9 ( < - + - - + s l s s s l s s q q s s q s q .
Substituting the expressions derived for  ) 0 , (s q ,  ) 0 , (s l ,  ) ˆ , ( s q s  and  ) ˆ , ( s s l , we
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simplistic framework.22
Since the denominator on the left hand side of inequality (9a) is clearly larger than the
denominator on the right hand side of the inequality, we focus on the numerators. It is
easy to confirm that the difference between the numerator on the left hand side of
inequality (9a) and the numerator on the right hand side of the inequality is:
[ ] 0 ˆ ) ( ) ( < ￿ - - - - s d a g b . Therefore, inequality (9a) holds, and thus
) 0 , ( ˆ ) ˆ , ( ˆ = < s e s e s s  for all  g b - < s ˆ .   ￿
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. With the zero subsidy
benchmark, dynamic stability was obtained through type 1’s discriminatory strategy.
Type 1 players exert an effort whenever they play with type 1 players but when they are
matched with type 0 players, they exert an effort only with some positive probability.
The introduction of a subsidy causes type 1 players, in the short run, to exert an effort in
all interactions, therefore allowing type 0 players to takes advantage of type 1’s
generosity and proliferate on her expense. The endogenous preference dynamics
eventually converge to a new stable preference profile with fewer type 1 players.
28
The decline in the share of socially minded individuals, and the corresponding decrease
of social incentives, more than offsets the initial rise in the monetary incentives
introduced by the subsidy policy.
4.  Concluding Remarks
The scope of this paper is limited as it considers only the link between public
policies and preferences. But the view (or the criticism) that economists should not
confine their discussion only to a world with exogenously given preferences is much
                                                            
 
28  The lower q induces a higher l  in the new stable equilibrium. However, this secondary effect is
dominated by the initial change of preferences in favor of the a-social type (type 0).23
broader in scope. Market institutions and government policies may affect the evolution
of values and norms of behavior as well as the evolution of preferences. This is not,
however, a new approach. The effects of economic institutions on human development
have been discussed ever since Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx.
29
As an additional example of the implications and generality of the approach
presented at this paper, one may consider the relationship between elections and
preferences. It is possible that given the voters’ preference profile, a candidate is
elected who implements a policy that changes the individuals’ preferences in such a
way that they would have been better off by electing the alternative candidate. On the
other hand, one may think about reinforcement dynamics. Plausibly, the elected party
will be able to implement a public policy which alters preferences in a way that would
increase its attractiveness and consequently its reelection probability.
                                                            
29  For a historical perspective, see the survey by Bowles (1998).24
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